Some years ago, in the course of a general critique of what has sometimes been referred to as the covering law theory of explanation, I made the claim that perfectly satisfactory explanations can often be provided by indicating only one or a few necessary conditions, where we remain ignorant of the sufficient conditions, of what we nevertheless claim to understand. What seemed to me one identifiable type of such explanations I called “explaining how-possibly,” because it was a type more naturally (...) given in response to the question how it could be that a certain thing happened than to the more familiar question why it did so. In the present paper I propose to review certain objections to this thesis which have come to my attention in the interval, and to make such concessions as these seem to require. In fact, the concessions will be minor, since the general thesis still seems to me quite defensible. (shrink)

A. J. P. Taylor's book, The Origins of the Second World War, has generated substantial criticism from historians. However, Taylor and his critics agree on many aspects of causality. At least four models of the cause versus condition, argument can be discerned in the work of both Taylor and his critics. The first is the "traditional" theory that the war was caused by a single man, Adolf Hitler. A second issue concerns what it means to say that Hitler "intended" to (...) take certain actions. The third is to what extent conditions forced the occurrence of particular events. The final conception of cause revealed is the notion of a condition which is sufficient to effect a result. Though Taylor seems to arrive at this position, he does not offer any opinion on the sufficient conditions themselves. (shrink)